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Security in IoT-Driven Mobile Edge Computing:
New Paradigms, Challenges, and Opportunities
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Prasad Garigipati, and Gagangeet Singh Aujla, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—With the exponential growth in the number of con-
nected devices, recent years have seen a paradigm shift towards
mobile edge computing. As a promising edge technology, it pushes
mobile computing, network control, and storage to the network
edges so as to provide better support to computation-intensive
Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Although it enables offload-
ing latency-sensitive applications at the resource-limited mobile
devices, decentralized architectures and diversified deployment
environments bring new security and privacy challenges. This is
due to the fact that, with wireless communications, the medium
can be accessed by both legitimate users and adversaries. Though
cloud computing has helped in substantial transformation of the
global business, it falls short in provisioning distributed services,
namely, security of IoT systems. Thus, the ever-evolving IoT
applications require robust cyber-security measures particularly
at the network’s edge, for widespread adoption of IoT applica-
tions. In this vein, the classical machine learning models devised
during the last decade, fall short in terms of low accuracy
and reduced scalability for real-time attack detection across
widely dispersed edge nodes. Thus, the advances in areas of
deep learning, federated learning, and transfer learning could
mark the evolution of more sophisticated models that can detect
cyberattacks in heterogeneous IoT-driven edge networks without
human intervention. We provide a SecEdge-Learn Architecture
that uses deep learning and transfer learning approaches to
provided a secure MEC environment. Moreover, we utilised
blockchain to store the knowledge gained from the MEC clusters
and thereby realising the transfer learning approach to utilise
the knowledge for handling different attack scenarios. Finally,
we discuss the Industry relevance of the MEC environment.
Index Terms—Mobile Edge Computing, Cloud Computing,
Internet of Things, 5G, Cyber-security, Deep learning, Reinforce-
ment learning, Time-series analysis, and Quality of Experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid advancements in wireless networks, mobile
operators have been witnessing an astonishing increase in
mobile data traffic. While providing a remarkable improve-
ment to the quality of lives, exponential growth of mobile
terminals is foreseen to impose an unprecedented pressure on
the backbone network, triggering challenges for cellular and
wireless networks. In addition, the emerging IoT technology
is expected to further stumble these networks, resulting in an
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explosive growth of Global Internet users. According to Cisco
Visual Networking Index, 27.1 billion networked devices and
connections will be used by 2022, contributing to a global
Internet traffic of 4.8 ZB comparable to 1.5 ZB in 2017 [1].
Moreover, the thriving demand of computational intensive ap-
plications has gained momentous ground to alleviate resource
deficiencies of mobile devices (e.g. lower processing power,
limited memory capacity, and constrained battery life).
The IoT infrastructure has been largely impacted by the
evolution of different network technologies (from 1G to 5G).
However, this gradual evolution, IoT has embarked a universal
stature and developed different forms, namely massive IoT,
broadband IoT, Commercial IoT, and Industrial automation
IoT. The related details are highlighted in the Fig. 1. These
developments are clearly indicative from the increasing pene-
tration of Internet users and connected devices. Consequently,
Gartner believes that the global IoT market will grow upto 19
Trillion by 2020 [2]. In spite of all the advancements in recent
years, smart mobile devices are still low potential computing
devices; constrained by their miniature size, weight, storage
capacity, and intrinsic limitations w.r.t wireless medium and
mobility. Such soaring demands for data services with immer-
sive Quality of Experience (QoE) are gaining ground towards
higher network and computation requirements.
In the past decade, mobile cloud computing (MCC) has
gained popularity, where a resource-rich cloud is used as a
platform to execute resource-intensive mobile applications. By
integrating mobile computing and cloud computing, MCC pro-
vided considerable capabilities to mobile devices and empow-
ered them with computing, storage, and energy resources to
enrich the computing experience of mobile users [3]. Through
MCC technology, mobile devices can continuously offload the
computing power and data storage requirements on powerful
centralized computing data centers that could not otherwise
be supported. As of today, multiple services are available
for augmenting storage potentials of mobile devices, such as
Dropbox, Amazon S3, iCloud, Google Drive, MobileMe, and
Skydrive. However, safety and reliability issues brought by
third party’s cloud systems have been the major challenges
for users utilizing such services. Moreover, the emerging trend
of IoT deployment pose new requirements in front of MCC,
such as geo-distribution support, real-time response, mobil-
ity support, low-latency, and location awareness. However,
traditional cloud setting cannot satisfy these demands for a
wide-range of emerging mobile applications due to longer
response times, affecting the QoE for end users. Thus, large-
scale IoT deployments suggest the urgent need for a distributed
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Fig. 1: Evolution of different network technologies
computing platform that can support the interactions between
IoT and cloud computing systems [4].
Driven by the visions of IoT and 5G communications, a
new trend in computing has emerged that extend the cloud
and its services to the edge of the network. This paradigm
is called Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) - a step further on
the MCC [5]. By pushing data intensive tasks towards the
edge, it offers several advantages, such as location awareness,
real-time response, high mobility support, low bandwidth
requirements, high throughput, and low latency, all due to its
proximity to terminal devices. It also offers an open radio
network edge platform in order to facilitate the use of the
storage and processing capabilities. Therefore, the MEC has
a wide range of applications, such as healthcare, connected
vehicles, video analytics, virtual reality, smart communities,
mobile big data analytics, smart grid, etc.
Broadly the paradigm of Edge Computing can be segregated
into four main types, i.e. device/mobile edge, on-premise edge,
telecom edge, and centralized cloud edge. These are shown
clearly using Fig. 2. The edge computing infrastructure is
largely supported by different mobile devices such as laptops,
mobiles, smart watches, smart camera, smart cars, etc. These
devices help to provide immediate and seamless services at
the edge of the network. However, with gradual advances in
technologies, many companies have also invested in different
forms of on-premise edge computing facilities which support
co-location and sharing of resources. On the other hand, there
is the first layer of edge computing that is supported by the
telecom industry and referred to as the telecom edge. It offers
strict realtime services with high performance index. And
finally, the largest and the most powerful of all is the cloud
edge that has fairly abundant resources but distantly located.
Though MEC has been envisioned as an enabling technology
to support local IoT applications, it faces a variety of security
and privacy threats. On one hand, it inherits security issues
from cloud computing whereas, on the other hand, decen-
tralized architectures and diversified deployment environments
raise the security consciousness to the next level. So, it is
important to develop security and privacy-preserving solutions
for MEC to support computing-based IoT applications and
open a wider market for application developers.
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Fig. 2: Overview of Edge Computing Framework
TABLE I: Comparative analysis of the existing schemes.
Work Environment Technique Used Scope
Du et. al [6] MEC Machine Learning Privacy preservation during data aggregation
Xiao et. al [7] MEC A collaborative security mechanism based on re-
inforcement learning, authentication, and secure
caching scheme
Security against data offloading and higher data privacy
Chen et. al in [8] MEC DL model to order to learn the attack features using
unsupervised learning
Communication security
He et. al [9] MSNs A social trust scheme based on a deep reinforcement
model
For enhanced security and efficiency of networks
Diro and Chilamkurti [10] Fog-to-thing computing DL For cyber-threat detection
Dai et. al in [11] IoT AI and Blockchain Improved flexibility and security of wireless networks
Khelifi et. al [12] IoT-based MECs Different DL models Data processing and analysis
Wang et. al [13] MEC Integration of deep reinforcement learning and fed-
erated learning
Improved caching mechanism
Lu et. al [14] Distributed edge computing
in vehicular networks
Federated learning Enhanced security
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
MEC is essentially employed to perform the compute-
intensive applications at the edge of transportation-driven
networks. However, over the course of time, the associated
traffic has seen prolific growth. Subsequently, security of the
underlying networks has become a mainstream concern for the
research community. Thus, in this direction, several proposals
have been proposed in the literature. Some of the notable
contributions are depicted in Table I and described below.
The authors in [6] devised a privacy persevering scheme
based on machine learning, particular for data aggregation
and data mining in MEC setups. According to the authors,
the MEC environments are easily prone to security attacks
due to the lack of a centralized management system for
managing the distributed mobile edge nodes. Once a single
node is hijacked by the attacker, the cyber attacks can easily
propagate across the network. Thus, the authors proposed a
novel architecture for MEC in heterogeneous IoT scenario.
Likewise, Xiao et. al [7] investigated in detail the attack
models in MEC environments. More importantly, the authors
also proposed a collaborative security mechanism based on
reinforcement learning, authentication, and secure caching
scheme. The former was employed for security against data
offloading onto the edge nodes, particularly against jamming
threats. On the contrary, the latter two were used for higher
data privacy. In a similar direction, Chen et. al in [8] identified
the problem of communications security in the MEC environ-
ments. Consequently, the authors designed a deep learning
(DL) model to order to learn the attack features from the
heterogeneous MEC setup using active unsupervised learning
approach.
In [9], authors focused on the security aspect of the Mobile
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social networks (MSNs), a variant of MEC. The authors
believed the information about social relationships amongst
the users is an important perquisite to enhance the security
and efficiency of these networks. Thus, they proposed a
social trust scheme based on a deep reinforcement model;
wherein the model automatically executes for optimal resource
allocations. Likewise, Diro and Chilamkurti [10] devised a
cyber-threat detection scheme based on the concepts of DL
in the context to fog-to-things computing. Dai et. al in [11]
identified the Blockchain and AI as the next most powerful
technologies for the wireless networks. In this context, the
authors propounded the integration of Blockchain and AI to
improve the performance of the wireless networks in terms of
flexibility and security. In detail, the content caching scheme
was designed by the authors using both blockchain and deep
reinforcement learning.
In IoT-driven MEC setups, data processing and analysis
is a daunting task. In this context, efficient models based
of DL and transfer learning (TL) can play a pivotal role.
This is because majority of the data in IoT-based MECs is
essentially device-driven; wherein manual interferences are not
required for data receiving and processing [12]. Thus, authors
in [12] merged different machine learning models based on
DL with the IoT’s information-centric networking deployed
at the edge of the network. In [13], Wang et. al proposed
the integration of deep reinforcement learning and federated
learning for enhancing the performance of MEC’s caching and
communication. The authors referred to this framework as the
“In-Edge AI” and it leveraged the benefits of both the devices
and edge nodes for exchanging the learning parameters in real-
time for high accuracy inferences. Lu et. al [14] identified
federated learning as a promising technology for distributed
edge computing; wherein the edge nodes can locally train their
respective models with the need to transmit their data to the
central sever. Nonetheless, the approach is novel but is prone
to security and privacy issues.
III. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
While applications of the heterogeneous IoT proliferate,
the data security and privacy protection mechanisms of the
cloud computing environment are no longer applicable to
MEC deployments. This creates a strong need to protect
the data from potential security threats ranging from pri-
vacy breaches to network availability and critical information
misuse. However, the increasingly connected technological
landscape raises significant challenges to the current MEC
paradigm. This includes access control, heterogeneity of MEC
systems, identity authentication, privacy preservation, secure
data aggregation, mis-configurations, diversity of communi-
cation technologies, secure content distribution, resilience to
attacks, lightweight protocol design, establishing trustworthy
data sharing practices, etc [15]. In addition, the lack of
comprehensive security mechanism render the deployment of
MEC a technically challenging problem. Further, the security
goals of MEC—confidentiality, integrity, availability, safety,
and resiliency—should be grounded on a combined objective
of securing the data and ensuring the safety and resiliency of
systems and processes. Thus, we aim to secure the distributed
applications and services for MEC through layered security
models wherein an effective hierarchical mechanism will be
developed in order to maintain a more secure and resilient
operating environment. However, the classical machine leaning
models fall short in terms of low accuracy and reduced
scalability for real-time attack detection across widely dis-
persed edge nodes. Thus, the advances in areas of DL could
mark the evolution of more sophisticated models that can
detect cyberattacks in heterogeneous IoT-driven edge networks
without human intervention.
IV. PROPOSED PARADIGM: SECEDGE-LEARN
The proposed architecture of the secure MEC ecosystem
based on different learning mechanisms is described compre-
hensively in the subsequent sections.
A. System Model
The proposed system model of the secure MEC environment
is shown in Fig. 3. The overall architecture can be segregated
into the following three layers, namely, mobile devices, MEC
servers, and the Internet core layer. The lowest layer comprises
of the mobile nodes at the edge of the network. These devices
are connected with the MEC servers via a high speed link.
The MEC servers are comparatively more powerful than the
mobile devices and provide the required services with reduced
latency. They are geographically distributed and form the core
of the MEC environment. This layer is connected to the upper
most layer via the backbone network. The uppermost layer
comprises of the computation intensive data centers.
An attacker in the MEC environment can launch attack at
various layers in the form of an adversary at the middle layers
or as a jammer or rogue mobile device at the lowest layer. The
different attack vectors that can be exploited by the attacker
fall in the range of man-in-the-middle attack, jamming attack,
denial of service attack, spoofing attack, etc.
B. Proposed Scheme
Thus, in order to safegaurd the MEC environment, a DL
model can be leveraged that comprises of different stages (as
shown in Fig. 3) such as:-
• Data acquisition: In particular, a set of features from the
MEC environment is used as the unlabeled samples which
are used to analyze attack behaviors
• Preprocessing and Feature extraction: The feature extrac-
tion module uses static/dynamic learning to preprocess
the attack features.
• Classification: This phase (also known as detection mod-
ule) uses this knowledge to make the attack detections.
Recent neural network models trained on large data sets
can obtain impressive performance across a wide variety
of IoT domains. But training these neural network models
is an expensive task especially for multivariate time-series
data. Unlike regression predictive modeling, time series adds
the complexity of a sequence dependence among the input

































Fig. 3: Secure three-layer MEC Architecture
neural network is considered as one of the powerful tool to
find the patterns of time sequential data. Thus, we propose a
LSTM model in order to achieve an optimal level of security
with reduced computational overhead. Further, reinforcement
learning (RL) has been proven to excel in sequential decision-
making tasks. One of the key features of RL is the focus on
learning a control policy to optimize the choice of actions
over several time steps. In lieu of this, the proposed scheme
is devised to operate in two phases: prediction and detection.
• In the first phase, prediction phase, a LSTM-based neu-
ral network is trained by investigating the features and
patterns of MEC time-series data.
• In the second phase, attack detection, we employ RL
approach to detect attacks using the trained model.
The above approach is suitable for application in a lim-
ited scenario where only a single MEC cluster is deployed.
However, when we have multiple MEC clusters, then we
need an approach that supports the cluster-wide distribution
by utilising the experience based on the above two phases in
a single cluster. For this reason, we can use TL that supports
storing of the knowledge gained form one MEC cluster and
using it for a different attack scenario in another MEC cluster.
Let us consider a case study to provide more clarity. In Fig.
4, we have shown different MEC clusters serving different
applications (such as mobile clients, vehicle clients, smart
home clients) at the same time. Now, if an attacker injects
a malicious script in the MEC cluster 1 using a compromised
mobile client, then our DL approach will help us to predict and
detect the attack in the MEC cluster using the two steps based
on LSTM and RL approaches. However, if another attacker
targets a different MEC cluster (let us say cluster 2) in the
future, then we have to repeat the same process again without
improvising the DL model using the attack scenario handled
in MEC cluster 1. One way to resolve this problem is to
perform the computationally expensive process of training the
model again but this can lead to inconsistencies, add to the
complexity, and generate additional overheads. So to resolve
this problem, we used the TL approach that helps us to transfer
the learning gained in the cluster 1 to other clusters. This way
we can improve the efficiency of the RL Agent (Smart Agent
in Fig. 4) significantly. To realise this TL approach in MEC
environment, we store the activity log of each cluster, that
can be used by the Smart Agents to transfer the knowledge
gained in different clusters to make it cluster-wide distribution.
However, there may be a chance of redundancy of same
knowledge being stored in the logs. So, to resolve this issue,
we deployed a blockchain network to validate each activity
log before using it for TL process. Once validated, it can be
distributed cluster-wide for further TL tasks. So, this means
we have two additional phases, depicted as below.
• In the third phase, blockchain phase, the activity log
collected from the above two phases is added to the ledger
and approved for a cluster wide distribution. The steps
followed in this phase are,
– A Smart Agent (also known as Learn Engine) is
deployed in each MEC cluster that is responsible for
all the tasks related to the learning mechanism. The
attack prediction and detection data is added to the
activity log and this log is added to a unique block
with the cluster identifier.
– It is then verified though a blockchain network and
and added to the ledger.
– On verification, the activity log is approved for
cluster-wide utilisation by Smart Agents through TL
approach. In case a similar log is already available
in the blockchain, it is not added to the blockchain.
• In the fourth phase, a TL approach is used to extract
the knowledge gained from other clusters and stored in
the ledger and thereafter use the same to handle different
attack scenarios through the MEC environment.
The workflow of the proposed SecEdge-Learn scheme is
presented using a sequence diagram as shown in Fig. 5
V. OPEN ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
To realise the above proposed architecture, there are several
research challenges and open issues that need to be addressed.
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Fig. 4: An illustration of the proposed SecEdge-Learn Architecture
Fig. 5: Sequence of activities in SecEdge-Learn
Some of them are listed below:
• Lack of provision of Policy Enforcement: There is signif-
icant impact of the lack of uniform policy enforcement
functions like, IP whitelisting, Virtual LAN, and VPN
termination that can lead towards issues related to the
integrity of the MEC network
• Age of Data: The data freshness is one of the key factors
for the success of critical applications running in the
MEC environment. Even more, the proposed learning
architecture has the tendency towards the degradation of
efficiency due the age of data (specifically for TL).
• Edge-cloud Coordination: The lack of reliable cloud-
edge communication capabilities to handle the processing
instances related to cloud services requiring real-time
support can lead to drastic performance issues.
• Secure Interworking among Networks/Clusters: As one
MEC network has to interwork with another network (for
example, a carrier’s MEC network has to coordinate with
an enterprise to ensure the provision of 5G capabilities),
the reliance on the MEC routers can lead to security
challenges and requires a firewall-based network solution.
• MEC-Blockchain Synergy: The coordination of MEC and
blockchain has not been deeply looked across in industrial
deployments, so there are several hidden challenges that
may come across for practical deployments.
• Complexity and Overheads: The deployment of multiple
learning mechanisms can in itself lead to challenging
scenarios where it can be tough to maintain the overheads
and sustain the complexity.
• Transition from 5G to 6G: The adoption of 5G and
transition towards 6G can lead to unexpected challenges
(interconnections and interfaces, coordination, user plane
function, management and control, and interworking be-
tween mobile and fixed bearers) for carrier access net-
work in large scale MEC deployments.
• Safety of Metadata or Sensitive Data: The risk of the loss
of data (sensitive or meta data) related to the organisation
or business enterprise activity and browsing behaviour
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can end up in serious implications from hackers using
compromised edge devices.
VI. DIRECTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES RELEVANT TO THE
INDUSTRY
With the proliferation of IoT, existing and upcoming next-
generation technologies such as software-defined networking,
autonomous vehicles (AUVs), augmented/virtual reality, and
industrial automation are fueling innovations across several
industries. As the size of IoT systems grow to large scale, their
impact will also increase on enterprise systems and consumer’s
everyday lives. Thus, enabling applications to make near real-
time decisions will be required in order to pave the way
for enhanced QoE and securing greater demand for services.
When paired with 5G, which promises improved capacity,
high bandwidth, and lower latency, MEC will create faster,
more efficient and intelligent networks while unlocking new
possibilities for digital businesses. Apart from hosting new
5G services, the other major network operator driver for MEC
is deploying virtualized network infrastructure, which in turn
is a key enabler for providing dynamic network slicing vital
for 5G services. By shifting resources to the edge, MEC
will enable new scenarios such as: augmented reality, mass
IoT, robotics, AUVs/drones, etc and it is foreseen that the
influence of these next generation systems will probably be
available by the end of 2020. According to Gartner, “75%
of enterprise data will be processed outside traditional data
centers or cloud by 2022 which is 10% till date” [2]. Enter-
prises are deriving benefits from MEC in the form of more
efficient utilization of network capacity. But as more rich
media and time-critical applications are deployed to benefit
from this wireless network, security vulnerabilities are bound
to increase. And as the network becomes more connected,
security breaches can be contagious. Thus, to sustain their
capacity and maintaining QoE to subscribers, it is important
to navigate through the opportunities and challenges of edge
intelligence. In this direction, integrating DL models into
edge devices will reduce the strain on overburdened networks
and protects essential services from outages or dependency
issues. As a whole, this technology is poised to provide ample
opportunities for businesses with a high potential for growth.
VII. CONCLUSION
The massive deployment of IoT applications across every
vertical of the global development has pushed the computing
and storage to edge of the network. MEC paradigm has
the capability to offload the real-time applications in the
local domain (closer to the user) at the compute-limited
mobile devices. However, the open access and communication
medium opens this paradigm to adversaries and attackers. Due
to this backdrop, we have investigated various security and
privacy challenges for MEC deployment in diverse application
domains. Furthermore, we utilised the learning technologies
(DL and TL) to suggest a potential security architecture for
MEC environment that has the capability to understand the
patterns of data or actions originating from different layers and
thereafter using these patterns to detect the potential attacks or
threat within a stipulated time. The potential challenges and
open issues that can impact the proposed security paradigm
are also discussed. Finally, the relevance and opportunities
relevant to the industry concerning the secure MEC deploy-
ment are also discussed. As a future prospective, we eye
towards realising a practical prototype of the proposed secure
MEC paradigm using different learning technologies relevant
to different industrial applications.
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